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ABSTRACT 
 
 
PRESCRIPTION FRAUD DETECTION VIA DATA MINING: 
A METHODOLOGY PROPOSAL 
 
Karca Duru Aral 
M.S. in Industrial Engineering 
Advisors: Prof. İhsan Sabuncuoğlu, Prof. Halil Altay Güvenir 
July, 2009 
 
 
Fraud is the illegitimate act of violating regulations in order to gain personal profit. 
These kinds of violations are seen in many important areas including, healthcare, computer 
networks, credit card transactions and communications.  Every year health care fraud causes 
considerable amount of losses to Social Security Agencies and Insurance Companies in many 
countries including Turkey and USA. This kind of crime is often seem victimless by the 
committers, nonetheless the fraudulent chain between pharmaceutical companies, health care 
providers, patients and pharmacies not only damage the health care system with the financial 
burden but also greatly hinders the health care system to provide legitimate patients with 
quality health care. One of the biggest issues related with health care fraud is the prescription 
fraud. This thesis aims to identify a data mining methodology in order to detect fraudulent 
prescriptions in a large prescription database, which is a task traditionally conducted by 
human experts. For this purpose, we have developed a customized data-mining model for the 
prescription fraud detection. We employ data mining methodologies for assigning a risk score 
to prescriptions regarding Prescribed Medicament- Diagnosis consistency, Prescribed 
 iii
Medicaments’ consistency within a prescription, Prescribed Medicament- Age and Sex 
consistency and Diagnosis- Cost consistency. Our proposed model has been tested on real 
world data. The results we obtained from our experimentations reveal that the proposed model 
works considerably well for the prescription fraud detection problem with a 77.4% true 
positive rate. We conclude that incorporating such a system in Social Security Agencies 
would radically decrease human-expert auditing costs and efficiency.  
 
Keywords: Fraud Detection, Prescription Fraud, Data Mining 
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 ÖZET 
 
VERİ MADENCİLİĞİ TEKNİKLERİ İLE REÇETE USULSÜZLÜKLERİNİN 
TESPİTİ: BİR YÖNTEM ÖNERİSİ 
 
 
Karca Duru Aral 
Endüstri Mühendisliği Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. İhsan Sabuncuoğlu, Prof. Dr. Halil Altay Güvenir 
Temmuz, 2009 
 
 
Her yıl, sağlık, bankacılık, bilgi işlem ve iletişim gibi bir çok önemli alanda görülen 
usulsüz işlemler önemli miktarda para, zaman, bilgi ve emek kaybına sebep olmaktadır.   
Sağlık alanında görülen usulsüzlükler, aralarında Türkiye ve Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nin 
de olduğu birçok ülkede sosyal güvenlik kurumları ve özel sağlık sigortası  şirketlerine ciddi 
zararlar vermekte ve sağlık sistemlerini olumsuz etkilemektedir. Uygulayanlar ve 
uygulanmasına göz yumanlar tarafından zararsız olarak algılanan sağlık sistemi 
usulsüzlükleri, ilaç firmalari, sağlık hizmeti sağlayıcıları, hastalar ve eczaneler arasındaki 
yasadışı bir ağ üzerinden yürütülmektedir. Bu usulsüz faaliyetler sosyal güvenlik kurumlarına 
yanlızca finansal zararlar vermekle kalmayıp, sağlık sistemlerinin daha etkin ve kaliteli 
işleyebilmesinin önünde büyük bir engel oluşturmaktadır. Sağlık harcamalarının yarısına 
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yakınının ilaç harcamaları üzerine olduğu ülkemizde, reçete usulsüzlükleri de önemli bir 
sorun teşkil etmektedir. 
 
Bu çalışma, veri madenciliğiyle büyük reçete veri tabanlarında usulsüzlük denetimi 
yapılması konusunda bir yöntem araştırmasını amaçlamıştır. Çalışmanın amacı, halihazırda 
uzmanlar tarafından rasgele seçim yoluyla yapılan reçete usulsüzlüğü denetiminin etkin bir 
otomasyon sistemiyle sağlanması için özelleştirilmis veri madenciliği teknikleri 
geliştirililmesidir. 
 
Bu amaçla, her reçeteye İlaç-Tanı uyumu, İlaç-Yaş uyumu, İlaç-İlaç uyumu, İlaç-
Cinsiyet uyumu ve Tani-Fiyat uyumuyla ilgili risk notları vermek üzere oluşturulan teknikler, 
sonrasında gerçek reçeteler kümesi üzerinde denenmiştir. Test kümesindeki usulsüz 
reçetelerin %77.4’ünü yakalayan sistem, reçete usulsüzlük denetimi açısından tatmin edici 
bulunmuş ve önerilen yöntemin sosyal güvenlik kurumları tarafından kullanılmasının uzman 
denetim masraflarının azaltılması ve denetim etkinliğinin arttırması açısından uygun 
olabileceği sonucuna varılmıştır.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Veri madenciliği, usulsüzlük denetimi, Reçete Usulsüzlükleri 
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Fraud is the abuse of a profit organization's system without necessarily leading to 
direct legal consequences [1]. Fraud constitutes a critical problem in many areas like health 
care, banking, insurance, and telecommunications. The fraudulent minority creates a big 
burden to the society to finance the fraudulent transactions.  Any effort aiming to debug the 
fraudulent transactions in the above-mentioned businesses and probably in many other ones, 
is named as a fraud detection process. Due to the complexity and enormity of the modern 
business systems, criminals may and do discover safety gaps and use them to steal data or to 
defraud somebody. Even if a fraud type is discovered by the authorities and safety regulations 
are managed, the criminals seek and find other fraudulent ways and thus shift behavior over 
time. Manual detection conducted by human experts is very expensive even to debug any 
fraud that has been committed; can’t detect all fraudulent transactions of a certain type; can’t 
be managed to detect the fraudulent behavior the moment it is attempted to be committed and 
lack the ability to detect the shifts and trends in fraudulent behavior.   
 
If we are to classify the fraudsters abusing an organization, according to their nature, 
we see that a business can be swindled by its managers, its employees or by the third parties. 
These external third parties are generalized by three types as organized, criminal, and average 
[1].  
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Average fraudsters are those who are not a part of an organized crime group, and 
have a tendency to commit fraudulent acts in an occasional manner. Even though these types 
of fraudsters are risky enough to be detected, organized or individual criminal fraudsters are 
more likely to cause more harm to the business system that is affected.  These kinds of 
fraudsters are committing their fraudulent acts in an organized manner, often involved with 
identity theft and change behavior over time to get through the detection systems and new 
regulations. Considering the large businesses, it is highly costly to manually check all 
transactions and activities. So, it can be said that the enormous databases of these large 
businesses should be detected by customized data mining algorithms, and then the riskiest 
transactions identified can be inspected by human experts.  
 
Fraud can also be grouped to be application or transaction fraud. In the application 
case, identity theft of falsified identity information is involved, whereas in the transactional 
case, a legitimate user/account information is abused by criminals.  
 
We can summarize the problems involved with fraud detection as below [3]: 
 
• Class distributions meaning the proportions between illegitimate transactions and 
legitimate transactions fluctuate. 
• Different types of fraud can affect a business.  
• Different styles of fraud have different behavioral characteristics in nature like being a 
one-time crime, being seasonal or being occasional.  
• These characteristics can shift by time. 
• Fraudsters change behavior to get through any new detection system and modify fraud 
styles.  
 
Fraud detection, being part of the overall fraud control, should automate and help to 
reduce the manual parts of a screening/checking process [1]. For large businesses, it is 
intuitive that data mining incorporated systems are one of the best tools for fraud detection if 
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not the only; since large business generate large databases on which human auditing is 
inefficient.  
 
Data mining is about finding insights which are statistically reliable, previously 
unknown, and actionable from data [2]. This data must be available, relevant, adequate, and 
clean. Also, the data mining problem must be well-defined, cannot be solved by query and 
reporting tools, and guided by a data mining process model [4]. 
 
Health care systems are among the largest of business systems in many countries. 
Being a business where enormous amounts of money cycles through, health care systems are 
very attractive targets for the above mentioned types of fraudsters. Below table illustrates the 
dimensions of the health care system in Turkey [5]:  
 
(billion YTL) 2002   2007 2008  
Total Social Insurance 
Spending 
7.6 20 24 
Total Medicament Spending 4.3 8.6 10.5 
Total Hospital Spending  2.8 10.3 13 
State Hospital Payments by 
SGK 
1.8 6.4 7.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          Table 1: Health Care Spending In Turkey by years 
 
According to Turkish Health Care Syndicate 2008 Health Care Report, fraud in 
health care has boomed recently. Having seen a yearly exponential increase in spending, 
health care systems’ abuse is becoming more and more critical. In 2008, health care fraud was 
committed principally in Van, Eskişehir, Erzurum, Siirt, Adana, Bursa, Zonguldak,  
Diyarbakır, and many other cities even in the Head Center of the Tuberculosis Fighting 
Department. These fraudulent acts were in the form of fake medicament reports, fake 
invoices, billing Social Security Agency (SSA) for examinations, and treatments that were not 
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rendered. The total cost of these fraudulent acts being millions of TL, about 300 people were 
arrested regarding fraud charges [5]. 
 
According to General Accounting Office of the USA, annual health care expenditures 
in USA have approached two trillion dollars, which is 15.3% of the Gross Domestic Product 
by 2007 [56]. 
 
      The optimistic estimates are that at least 3% of health care expenditures which adds up 
to be $60 billion are lost due to fraud in USA. Other estimates are around 10% or $170 billion 
for this lost amount [57].   
 
Fraud and abuse are not only widespread and very costly in United States' and 
Turkey’s health-care systems but also are very destructive in many other countries. Examples 
for fraud in a healthcare system would be billing for services and goods that are not rendered, 
performing medically unnecessary operations or prescribing unnecessary medicaments. Abuse 
involves charging for services that are not medically necessary, that do not conform to 
professionally recognized standards, or are unfairly priced. Some examples for abusive 
behaviors would be performing a laboratory test on large numbers of patients when only a few 
should have it or x-raying those without the definite need. Abuse and fraud are similar; 
nonetheless it is not possible to prove that the abusive acts were done with intent to deceive 
the insurer. 
 
Prescription fraud is one of the types of health care fraud that has been commonplace 
in Turkey and constitutes an enormous burden on the Social Security Agency and the private 
insurance companies. This type of fraud compromises of excessive medicament prescription, 
and disunity of patients’ features with the prescribed medicaments. The perception of the 
society that the prescription fraud is a victimless crime make it even more widespread and 
strengthen the fraudulent chain between the pharmaceutical companies, physicians, 
pharmacies, and patients. The orthodox manual detection is conducted by a committee of 
assigned medical doctors in the Social Security Agency. When inspecting a hospital, the 
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human expert goes through a small sample of the prescriptions associated by the hospital and 
then the agency charges the hospital by paying the amount acquired by multiplying the 
proportion of the fraudulent claims seen in the sample and the total cost of the prescriptions 
issued by the hospital in that inspection era. This method is both costly to conduct and does 
not guarantee any efficiency coefficient.  
 
When considering the immense amount of data associated with the health care system, 
it is trivial that any system dealing with prescription fraud should be automated and fail-safe 
to a considerable degree. Since nearly half of the spending of the SSA is on the medicament 
which was around 10.5 billion TL in 2008 [5], we see that the cost of the fraudulent 
prescriptions to the Social Security Agency is not tolerable. Thus, any system should be able 
to find the prescriptions that constitute a certain fraud probability assessed by the user. This 
probability should be such that the system functions with minimum amount of false negatives, 
that is to say minimum amount of fraudulent prescriptions being left undetected. This 
probability coefficient should be determined considering the human expert revising necessary 
for the output of the system. That way, the cost efficiency should be maintained.  
  
 Having revised the necessities of a cost effective system, we can conclude that such a 
system should incorporate the appropriate data mining methodologies enabling an automated, 
rapid, and efficient online structure that can be integrated with the electronic online provision 
systems already in use.  
 
Our proposition for such a system is based on certain risk measurements calculated for 
each of the patient’s features compared to the common practice. We also propose to detect 
each pair of medicaments in the prescription since a pair may be in contraindication. An alike 
risk measurement is taken for each medicament pair in the prescriptions. The risk 
measurement is based on the assumption that, fraudulent behavior related to a certain feature 
is rare when considering the total data set. The data set we work on is a set of 26,419 real 
world prescriptions. 
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Next chapter is on the literature review conducted for both general fraud detection, 
health care fraud detection methodologies, and outlier detection, which is largely employed 
for fraud detection. This survey indicates that there are three main types of fraud detection 
techniques proposed for health care. These are supervised, unsupervised, and hybrid systems 
of two. Since we work on a data set without any prior knowledge on prescriptions’ label to be 
fraudulent or not, our proposed system is an unsupervised one.  
 
The third chapter focuses on the data structure in hand, the revised methodologies in 
the literature to see if those are applicable to our problem, our methodology proposal, and the 
related risk formulations. 
 
The forth chapter gathers the application outputs and the computational results. We 
briefly go over the offline and online processing as well as their outputs. We give the results 
of applications on the real world data with an emphasis on the offline and online applications. 
The validations of the system’s efficiency are conducted by validation study comparing the 
system outputs with those of a human expert labels. 
 
We will conclude by a revision of the proposed system and further study directions.   
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Chapter 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
There are various resources relating to fraud detection. Fraud detection being a 
relatively large field, most of the papers on this subject consider outlier detection as a primary 
tool. Nonetheless, health care fraud detection studies are limited. When we come to the more 
specific field of prescription fraud detection, we see that there is no other study in this 
particular field. In this chapter, we focus on fraud detection, outlier detection and health care 
fraud detection studies in the literature.  
 
As stated earlier, fraud detection automates transaction investigation efforts. In this 
regard, evolved and customized algorithms for the data in hand to check are the best possible 
answer for this business critical problem. We see that, the studies in this field mainly 
compromise of artificial intelligence, data mining, expert systems, fuzzy logic, statistics and 
visualization. The main shortcomings of data mining-based fraud detection research are that 
the lack of publicly available real data for experimentations and the lack of published 
methods. Even though studies continue for more effective solutions, there are commercially 
available data mining software with the claim to be competent to detect fraud in many sector 
specific cases. 
 
 
 
7 
 
2.1. FRAUD DETECTION LITERATURE BY SUBJECT 
 
When we group the studies regarding fraud detection, we see that most of the studies 
group around administrative fraud detection, credit card fraud detection, telecommunications 
fraud detection and insurance fraud detection. 
 
 Internal fraud meaning the loss due to acts of a type intended to defraud, 
misappropriate property or circumvent regulations, the law or company policy, excluding 
diversity / discrimination events, which involves at least one internal party [6]. This type of 
fraud being stated to be one of the operational risks by the Basel Committee is a big problem 
involving accounting, financial statement and occupational fraud. There are studies in the 
literature to pinpoint internal fraud by Lin et al., (2003) proposing a Fuzzy Neural Network 
for Assessing the Risk of Fraudulent Financial Reporting; by Bell and Carcello, (2000); by 
Fanning and Cogger, (1995) proposing a neural network approach; by Summers and 
Sweeney, (1998) focusing on an empirical analysis on misstated financial statements; by 
Beneish, (1997) proposing a model providing assessments of the likelihood of manipulation 
in financial reports; by Green and Choi, (1997) proposing another neural network for 
assessing the risk of management fraud. Kim et al., (2003) focuses on an anomaly detection 
approach for fraud detection in retail sector. For this, implementing features of the human 
immune system is proposed.  
 
When we consider the insurance fraud; home insurance is a field studied by Bentley, 
(2000), proposing fuzzy rules and by Von Altrock, (1997), proposing fuzzy logic. Crop 
insurance is studied by Little et al., (2002) applying data mining methodologies. Automobile 
insurance is studied by Phua et al., (2004) in which a classification of skewed data is made; 
by Viaene et al., (2004) proposing implementing Naive Bayes for claim fraud diagnosis; by 
Brockett et al., (2002) proposing Principal Component Analysis for fraud classification; by 
Stefano and Gisella, (2001) proposing a fuzzy expert system; by Belhadji et al., (2000)  
proposing a system based on the systematic use of fraud indicators; and by Artis et al., (1999) 
on modeling types of automobile insurance fraud behavior. 
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 For medical/health care insurance fraud detection, there are a number of studies in the 
literature. Yamanishi et al., (2004) propose applying finite mixtures. Major and Riedinger, 
(2002) define a hybrid knowledge and statistical-based system named as EFD as in Electronic 
Fraud Detection. Williams, (1999) proposes evolutionary hot spots data mining. He et al., 
(1999) incorporates a hybrid system of genetic algorithms and k-nearest neighbor method. 
Cox, (1995) proposes a fuzzy system. Yang, W. and Hwang S. (2006) propose a process-
mining framework for health care fraud detection. Ortega et al., (2007) incorporate a data 
mining methodology on multilayer perceptron neural networks.  
 
There are two types of credit fraud detection, one is on screening credit applications 
and the other is the credit card transactions. Wheeler and Aitken, (2000) describe an 
application of case-based reasoning for eliminating fraud in credit approval process. For credit 
card transactions there are studies by Fan, (2004); Chen et al., (2004); Chiu and Tsai, (2004); 
Foster and Stine, (2004); Kim and Kim, (2002); Maes et al., (2002); Syeda et al., (2002); 
Bolton and Hand, (2001); Bentley et al., (2000); Brause et al., (1999); Chan et al., (1999). 
They propose systematic data selection, support vector machines, a web-based scheme, 
predictive modeling, neural classifiers, Bayesian and neural networks, parallel granular neural 
networks, unsupervised profiling methods, fuzzy Darwinian detection, neural data mining, 
and distributed data mining, respectively.  
 
For telecommunications fraud, there is subscription abuse and phone call abuse. 
Cortes et al., (2003); Cahill et al., (2002); Rosset et al., (1999), have worked on subscription 
fraud, proposing dynamic graphs, data mining, rule based induction, respectively.  Kim et al., 
(2003); Burge and Shawe-Taylor, (2001); Moreau et al., (1999); Murad and Pinkas, (1999) 
have studied the phone- call fraud problems.  These studies focus on support vector machines, 
unsupervised neural network, hybrid systems and unsupervised profiling, respectively. 
 
Other less studied fraud detection problems are e-business, government tax and 
customs’ fraud. Barse et al., (2003) and McGibney and Hearne, (2003) focus on video web-
sites and voice-over-ip telecommunications fraud, respectively. Bhargava et al., (2003) and 
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Sherman, (2002) propose methodologies to monitor online sellers and online buyers, 
respectively, by automated systems. Bonchi et al., (1999) studied tax fraud. Shao et al., 
(2002) has worked on customs’ fraud.  
 
2.2. AVAILABLE DATA FOR FRAUD DETECTION 
 
The literature survey by Phua et al., 2004, reveals that publicly available data for fraud 
detection is limited to a small automobile insurance database screened by the same author. 
This survey indicates that telecommunications and credit fraud detection are the domains 
where large databases with many attributes can be found. Whereas for insurance and internal 
fraud, studied databases are limited. There are even studies on 100 examples available. 
Nonetheless, attribute numbers for the insurance and internal fraud studies can be as high as 
150. The paper with largest database on insurance fraud is by Williams, 1999, with 40000 
examples [1,24].  
 
The employed attributes in the literature are either binary, numerical, categorical or a 
combination of those. The attributes for medical insurance databases are patient demographics 
(age and sex), treatment details (services), and policy and claim details (benefits and amount) 
[1]. 
 
Data mining methodologies in the literature either use training data with 
fraud/legitimate labels, examples of legal transactions or data with no labels to indicate fraud 
or legitimacy.  
 
2.3. INCORPORATED METHODOLOGIES  
 
We can group the existing methodologies of fraud detection as being supervised, 
unsupervised, or as being hybrids of the above. These data mining methodologies are 
described as:  
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2.3.1. Supervised Approaches  
 
Supervised algorithms are trained by previously labeled training set of fraudulent and 
legitimate transactions. Then, the algorithms allocate mathematical methodologies to assign 
scores of similarity with the fraudulent profiles. The most popular applications of supervised 
algorithms are Neural networks are support vector machines (SVMs).  
 
Kim et al. (2003) define SVM ensembles with for telecommunications subscription 
fraud. Barse et al. (2003) propose a multi-layer neural network to handle synthetic database of 
Video-on-Demand. For credit card fraud detection Syeda et al. (2002) propose fast rule 
generation by fuzzy neural networks on parallel machines. A feed-forward Radial Basis 
Function (RBF) neural network with three-layers was proposed by Ghosh and Reilly (1994). 
This neural network was trained in two phases. It was used to assigning risk scores to new 
credit card transactions in every two hours. 
 
Maes et al. (2002) conducted a comparison study between neural networks and 
Bayesian networks. This study incorporates the STAGE algorithm for Bayesian networks.  
Back propagation algorithm was used to train the neural networks. The results indicate that 
even thought Bayesian networks are more accurate and needs a short training time, they are 
slower to be applied for new instances. Such a Bayesian Network was developed by Ezawa 
and Norton (1996), which has four stages and two parameters. This paper asserts that all the 
methods of regression, nearest neighbor, and neural networks are too slow for their data in 
hand. Decision trees were also problematic with some discrete variables in the dataset. Viaene 
et al. (2004) propose AdaBoosted naive Bayes (fully independent boosted Bayesian network) 
with weight of evidence formulation for scoring. When compared with unboosted and boosted 
naive Bayes, the proposed method had slightly better accuracy.  
 
Some other methodologies are decision trees, rule induction, and case-based 
reasoning. Fan (2004) introduced systematic data selection to mine concept-drifting, possibly 
insufficient, data streams. The paper proposed a framework to select the optimal model from 
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four different models (based on old data chunk only, new data chunk only, new data chunk 
with selected old data, and old and new data chunks). The selected old data is the examples 
which both optimal models at the consecutive time steps predict correctly. The cross validated 
decision tree ensemble is consistently better than all other decision tree classifiers and 
weighted averaging ensembles under all concept-drifting data chunk sizes, especially when 
the new data chunk size of the credit card transactions are small. With the same credit card 
data as Fan (2004), Wang et al. (2003) demonstrates a pruned classifier C4.5 ensemble which 
is derived by weighting each base classifier according to its expected benefits and then 
averaging their outputs. The authors show that the ensemble will most likely perform better 
than a single classifier which uses exponential weighted average to emphasize more influence 
on recent data. 
 
Rosset et al. (1999) presents a two-stage rules-based fraud detection system which 
first involves generating rules using a modified C4.5 algorithm. Next, it involves sorting rules 
based on accuracy of customer level rules, and selecting rules based on coverage of fraud of 
customer rules and difference between behavioral level rules. It was applied to a 
telecommunications subscription fraud. Bonchi et al. (1999) use boosted C5.0 algorithm on 
tax declarations of companies. Shao et al. (2002) apply a variant of C4.5 for customs fraud 
detection. Case-based reasoning (CBR) was used by Wheeler and Aitken (2000) to analyze 
the hardest cases which have been misclassified by existing methods and techniques. 
Retrieval is performed by threshold nearest neighbor matching. Diagnosis utilize multiple 
selection criteria (probabilistic curve, best match, negative selection, density selection, and 
default) and resolution strategies (sequential resolution-default, best guess, and combined 
confidence), which analyze the retrieved cases. The authors claim that CBR had 20% higher 
true positive and true negative rates than common algorithms on credit applications. 
 
As for the statistical modeling, Foster and Stine (2004) employ least squares 
regression and stepwise selection of predictors. They assert that traditional statistical methods 
are effective to be used for fraud detection. Belhadji et al. (2000) propose the cooperation of 
human experts for choosing best indicators (attributes) for fraud detection. Then, they 
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calculate conditional probabilities of fraud for each indicator. As the third step, Probit 
regressions are used to define the most important indicators. Prohit regression is used for 
fraud prediction on automobile property damages. The flexible thresholds are adjustable for 
customization regarding any company’s fraud policy. In another study on automobile 
insurance data, Artis et al. (1999) make a comparison between multinomial logit model 
(MNL) and nested multinomial logit model (NMNL) on a classification problem. Both 
models provide estimated conditional probabilities for the three classes.  
 
Some other techniques are expert systems, association rules, and genetic algorithms. 
Nonetheless the papers on the above mentioned techniques do not make efficiency or 
effectiveness comparisons with any existing techniques. Major and Riedinger (2002) have 
created an expert system to detect medical insurance fraud in which expert knowledge is 
integrated with statistical techniques. Pathak et al. (2003), Stefano and Gisella (2001) have 
studied fuzzy expert systems. Chiu and Tsai (2004) define Fraud Patterns Mining (FPM) 
algorithm, transformed from Apriori, in order to mine credit card data. Bentley (2000) 
proposes genetic programming with fuzzy logic for data classification on real home insurance 
claims and credit card transaction data.  
 
2.3.2. Semi-supervised Approaches  
 
Kim et al. (2003) present a five-step fraud detection method. First, rules are generated 
randomly by association rules algorithm Apriori; then rules are applied on legitimate labeled 
transaction database and any rule matching this data is eliminated. Third, the rules that are left 
are used for screening. Any rules, which cannot detect any anomalies, are eliminated. Fourth, 
any rule that can detect anomalies are refined by tiny random mutations. In the last step, the 
successful rules are retained. This proposed methodology is tested on retail transaction 
processing system internal fraud data. 
 
For telecommunications fraud detection, Murad and Pinkas (1999) employ profiling. 
Profiling is attained by summarizing the calls daily and by overall levels of normal behavior 
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of each account. Clustering algorithm with cumulative distribution distance function is used 
to define the common daily profiles. When the profile’s call duration, destination, and 
quantity exceed the threshold and standard deviation of the profile an alert is raised.  
 
2.3.3. Unsupervised Approaches 
 
In the area of telecommunications fraud detection, Cortes et al. (2001) study temporal 
evolution of large dynamic graphs. The graphs are built up by the sub graphs named as 
Communities of Interest (COI). Exponential weighted average method is used to update sub 
graphs daily. COIs are built up by the mobile phone accounts using call quantity and 
durations. The study had revealed specifications of the telecommunication fraudsters. Burge 
and Shawe and Taylor (2001) use a recurrent neural network to identify account behavior 
profiles.  
In medical insurance domain, Yamanishi et al. (2004) presented the unsupervised 
SmartSifter. The algorithm can work with categorical and continuous variables. SmartSifter 
investigates statistical outliers by Hellinger distance. On automobile insurance data, Brockett 
et al. (2002) propose employing Principal Component Analysis of RIDIT scores on rank-
ordered categorical attributes.  
 
In credit card transactions, Bolton and Hand (2001) present Peer Group Analysis in 
screening inter-account behavior changes by time by comparing the cumulative weekly mean 
amount between the account in question and the similar accounts.  Bolton and Hand (2001) 
present Break Point Analysis to screen intra-account behavior changing over time. This 
method is used to detect any significant peaks in spending of an account. The t-test is used to 
rank the accounts.  
 
2.3.4. Hybrid Approaches  
 
 Supervised Hybrids  
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There are studies in the literature integrating supervised algorithms like neural 
networks, Bayesian networks, and decision trees. Chan et al. (1999) try to combine naive 
Bayes, C4.5, CART, and RIPPER classifiers. The results give better efficiency on credit card 
transactions. Phua et al. (2004) propose back propagation neural networks, naive Bayes, and 
C4.5 as classifiers. A single meta-classifier is used to identify the best base classifier among 
those, and then integrate the base classifiers’ predictions on automobile insurance claims. 
Ormerod et al. (2003) use a rule generator to adjust the weights of the proposed Bayesian 
network. Kim and Kim (2002) define a decision tree algorithm to classify the data in hand. 
They use a weighting function to compute fraud density, and then a back propagation neural 
network is used to generate a weighted risk score on credit card transactions. He et al. (1999) 
use genetic algorithms to compute optimal weights of the attributes, then the k-nearest 
neighbor algorithm is employed to classify the general practitioner (GP) dataset.  
 
Supervised/Unsupervised Hybrids  
 
Labeled data is used for supervised and unsupervised hybrids in telecommunications 
fraud detection. Cortes and Pregibon (2001) propose the use of daily updated 
telecommunication account summaries (signatures). The fraudulent labeled signatures are 
then added to the training set. This set is then used for training the supervised algorithms such 
as tree, slipper, and model-averaged regression. The authors assert that fraudulent calls have 
nature of late night activity and long call durations. Cortes et al. (2003) propose a graph-
theoretic method. This method is used to visually detect fraudulent international calls. Cahill 
et al. (2002) compute a risk score to each call regarding its similarity to fraudulent profiles 
and dissimilarity to the account’s signature. The signatures are updated with low-score calls. 
In this updating process, recent calls are given more weight than older calls. 
 
Moreau et al. (1999) indicate that supervised neural network and rule induction 
algorithms perform better than two types of unsupervised neural networks in identifying the 
shifts between short and long term account behavior profiles. They used AUC as the 
performance measure.  
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 There are studies in which unsupervised approaches are used to classify the insurance 
data into clusters for incorporating supervised approaches. A three step procedure is proposed 
by Williams and Huang (1997) in which: k-means is employed for cluster detection, C4.5 is 
used for decision tree rule induction, and domain knowledge, then statistical summaries and 
visualization tools are utilized for rule evaluation. Williams (1999) employs a genetic 
algorithm for the second step to generate rules. This enables the user to explore the rules. in 
automobile injury claims, Brockett et al. (1998) propose a technique using Self Organizing 
Maps (SOM) for clustering just before employing back propagation neural networks  
 
On medical providers’ claims, He et al. (1997), use hybrids of back propagation neural 
networks and SOMs in order to screen the classification results. Brause et al., (1999) present 
RBF neural networks for screening the outputs of association rules for credit card 
transactions. 
 
2.4. OUTLIER DETECTION  
 
Outlier detection methods have been suggested for numerous applications, such as 
credit card fraud detection, clinical trials, voting irregularity analysis, data cleansing, network 
intrusion, severe weather prediction, geographic information systems, athlete performance 
analysis, and other data mining tasks [60]. 
 
Outlier detection methods in the literature are:  
• Univariate methods  
• Multivariate methods  
 
 Another classification of outlier detection methods is between:  
• Parametric (statistical) methods and 
• Nonparametric methods that are model-free  
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Assuming a known underlying distribution of the observations, statistical parametric 
methods are based on statistical estimates of unknown distribution parameters. Outliers are 
defined to be the observations that deviate from the model assumptions by statistical methods. 
Papadimitriou et al., (2002) state that statistical parametric methods are often unsuitable for 
high-dimensional data sets and for arbitrary data sets without prior knowledge of the 
underlying data distribution. 
 
Data mining methods are in the class of non-parametric outlier detection methods. 
These methods are called to be distance-based. Being able to work on large databases, these 
methods mostly incorporate local distance measures [62,63,64,65,66,55] 
 
Clustering techniques constitute another class of non-parametric outlier detection 
methods. Points in small sized clusters are labeled to be outliers.  
 
Detection methods for spatial outliers compose another class of non-parametric outlier 
detection methodologies. Such methods look for locally deviating instances regarding the 
neighbor observations.  
 
Earlier studies in univariate outlier detection literature are built on the assumption of 
the data being identically and independently distributed from a known distribution [60] 
Another assumption under which many other works are conducted is that distribution 
parameters and the type of the expected outliers are known as well. It is trivial that these 
assumptions do not hold for real world data in general. 
 
For observations with multivariable attributes, multivariate analysis is performed. This 
enables to identify the interactions among different variables. Ben Gal, I. (2005) gives a 
simple example as illustrated in Figure 1 for this need. This is an example of points plotted on 
two dimensions on x and y axis. It is intuitive that there is one outlier in this case, which is a 
multivariate outlier but not univariate. If we consider each attribute (x and y coordinates) 
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separately, the outlier point is not an outlier in either of the measures. Therefore, outlier 
detection should consider the relationships between any two attributes. 
                                        
                Figure 1: Scatter Plot of a sample on x and y coordinates 
 
Thus, multivariate outlier detection procedures can either be statistical or data mining 
based. As stated earlier, statistical methods are based on the assumption of known 
distributions. The statistical methods of multivariate outlier detection try to identify the 
outliers as being the points that are stated being away from the center of the data distribution. 
The measurement of this distance can be done by a number of different distance measures. 
The effectiveness of the outlier detection procedure can be increased by incorporating robust 
estimates as in one-dimensional procedures. The most prevalent estimates are the distribution 
mean and the variance-covariance [67]. 
 
As stated earlier, data mining methodologies are mostly non-parametric, not needing 
the assumption of prior knowledge of the data distribution model. Data-mining methodologies 
are formed to handle large databases that are multi-dimensional. The sub groups of this 
category are:  
• Distance-based methods, 
• Clustering methods,  
• Spatial methods. 
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As a non-parametric data mining methodology, distance-based methods were first 
proposed by Knorr and Ng (1997, 1998).  The first definition of a distance based outlier is 
that being so if the observation in question is placed at a distance r from at least a β percent of 
the rest of the observations. Acuna and Rodriguez (2004) underline that this definition is 
problematic since it necessities the determination of r and β and a ranking for the outliers. The 
time complexity of the algorithm based on this definition is  where number of the 
attributes (features) is p and n is the size of the sample. Therefore, it is impractical to be used 
in large datasets. Another problem of this definition is that, if the data set has dense and sparse 
regions, definition turns to be inadequate as stated in Ramaswamy et al., (2000) and 
Papadimitriou et al., (2002). 
)( 2pnO
 
Another definition of outliers is presented by Ramaswamy et al., (2000). This 
definition can be stated as: given two integers v and l (v < l), outliers are defined to be the top 
l sorted observations having the largest distance to their  nearest neighbor. A critique of 
this latter definition is that the information on the closer neighbors is lost when considering 
only the  nearest neighbor. Another way to overcome this drawback is to define outliers to 
be the observations of which the average distance to the  nearest neighbors is large. Acuna 
and Rodriguez, 2004 points out that the drawback of this latter definition to be the longer 
computational time needed.  
thv
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As for clustering based methods, these methods define small-sized clusters including a 
cluster of one observation to be outlier. Partitioning around medoids (PAM), Clustering large 
applications (CLARA) by Kaufman and Rousseeuw, (1990); and a fractal-dimension based 
method by Barbara and Chen, (2000) are among the examples for such methods. We need to 
underline that designed for clustering; these methodologies aren’t really for outlier detection. 
As stated in Papadimitriou et al. (2002), the outlier detection criteria are usually implicit and 
clustering procedures do not easily convey these criteria. 
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The next group of non-parametric methodologies being spatial methods, these are 
relevant with the above-mentioned clustering methods. This methodology’s applications are 
mostly seen in domains that convey spatial information, like, ecology, geographic information 
systems, transportation, climatology, location-based services, public health and public safety. 
 
A spatial outlier is a spatially referenced object whose non-spatial attribute values are 
significantly different from the values of its neighborhood [72]. The authors classify the 
spatial methodologies by two groups of quantitative tests and graphic approaches.  
 
The first group of methods presents tests to identify spatial outliers from the rest of 
database. Two representative approaches in this category are the Scatter plot by Haining, 
(1993) is an example of this group of methods.  
 
Graphic methods employ visualization of spatial data, highlighting the outliers. Haslett 
et al., 1991, Panatier, 1996 propose Variogram clouds and pocket plots for graphic outlier 
detection, respectively. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) was presented by Schiffman et al. 
(1981). Like in a map, MDS illustrates the analogy of observations. Penny and Jolliffe (2001) 
present metric and non-metric MDS reformulations.  
 
The method for detecting spatial outliers in graph data set by Shekhar et al. (2001, 
2002) employs the distribution property of the difference between the value of an attribute 
and the average attribute value of the neighbors. Shekhar, et al., (2003) present an approach to 
make a comparison between spatial outlier-detection methods.  
 
2.5. HEALTH CARE FRAUD DETECTION 
 
There are three groups of health care fraud detection studies. The first group uses 
supervised methodologies. The second group incorporates unsupervised algorithms. The third 
group uses multiple methodologies of one or both of the first two.  
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Predictive supervised algorithms examine all previously labeled transactions to 
mathematically determine how a standard fraudulent transaction looks like by assigning a risk 
score [1]. As a supervised fraud detection method, neural networks seem to be the most 
popular ones. Here are the supervised fraud detection studies in the literature:  
 
Ormerod et al. (2003) propose the usage of a Bayesian Network. They present a Mass 
Detection Tool (MDT) for detection of medical insurance fraud. Ethnography is the core 
element of the algorithm for specifying needs and process, capture expertise, and design an 
interface for triggering fraud indicators while capturing unexpected anomalies detected by 
claims handlers. The MDT uses a dynamic Bayesian Belief Network of fraud indicators, The 
system employs automated knowledge updating to keep up with dynamically changing fraud, 
adding new indicators that emerge from patterns of repeated anomalies [52].   
 
Chan CL et al. (2001) introduces a Fuzzy Bayesian Classifier. This research combines 
the Bayesian classifier and the Fuzzy Set Theory to create a new data mining methodology.  
Bayesian classifier, based on Bayesian inference, is one of the data mining techniques that can 
be used for classification problems. Bayesian classifier classifies by incorporating all features 
influencing the classification result. The Bayesian classifier, having a good power of 
interpretation of the result, needs to associate different probability distributions when dealing 
with continuous attributes, which increases the complexity of the computation. To overcome 
this, Fuzzy set theory is exercised to transform the continuous attributes into discrete ones. 
This system is then used in analyzing health insurance fee data. 80% of the data set was used 
to train the Fuzzy Bayesian Classifier and then, the system was tested on the 20% of the data.  
The true positive rate (sensitivity) of the classifier is 0.639 and the true negative rate 
(specificity) is 0.968 [53].   
  
Ortega et al. (2007) describes another medical claim fraud/abuse detection system 
based on data mining used by a Chilean private health insurance company. The proposed 
detection system employs multilayer perceptron neural networks (MLP). The entities 
involved in the medical fraud problem are as: medical claims, affiliates, medical professionals 
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and employers. The multilayer perceptron neural network is trained for the features of all 
these entities. The proposed fraud detection system is shown to detect 75 fraudulent cases per 
month [58]. 
 
Unsupervised algorithms are relatively less incorporated as a health care fraud 
detection tool. There were two examples seen in the literature survey in the process of making 
this thesis.  
 
The first one is the Electronic Fraud Detection (EFD) proposed by Major et al. (2002) 
which introduces the usage of an expert system. Electronic Fraud Detection (EFD) is designed 
to assist the Investigative Consultants in the Managed Care & Employee Benefits Security 
Unit of the Travelers Insurance Companies in the detection of frauds committed by health 
care providers [23].  The database that EFD is designed for has never been investigated 
manually and it has few positive examples. In order to get through these problems, EFD 
incorporates two levels of knowledge discovery techniques. In the first level, in order to 
highlight the unusual provider behavior, EFD incorporates expert knowledge and statistical 
information assessment. The 27 behavioral heuristics employed in EFD are used to screen and 
to measure the provider behavior in question. The rules seek to identify providers which seem 
to deserve a human expert investigation. Then, new rules are built by machine learning in 
order to enhance the screening efforts. Pilot operations had been carried out to analyze 22,000 
health care providers. Then a prototype system got implemented in SAS Institute's SAS 
System, AICorp's Knowledge Base Management System, and Borland International's Turbo 
Prolog.  
 
The second unsupervised methodology is proposed by Yamanishi et al. (2004) and 
named as SmartSifter which is an outlier detection engine addressing the problem from the 
viewpoint of statistical learning theory. The proposed methodology, SmartSifter works online 
to identify outliers, incorporating the online unsupervised training of a finite mixture model 
on the information in hand. Every time there is a new entry to the system, SmartSifter runs to 
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learn the new probabilistic model. The output of the SmartSifter is score given for the new 
entry. In the case of a high score, the new entry is said to have a high risk to be an outlier.  
The superiority of SmartSifter are identified to be it being adaptive to changing sources of 
data; its output being a score which has a easily understandable meaning; it being 
computationally inexpensive; and it being able to work with both categorical and continuous 
variables. SmartSifter’s experimental applications have been shown to identify meaningful 
rare cases in real-life health insurance pathology data from Australia's Health Insurance 
Commission [22].  
 
Hybrid methods consist of a combination of supervised and unsupervised methods or 
concatenating two or more methods in one of the supervised/unsupervised groups.   
 
Williams et al. (1999) present the hot spots methodology. The proposed methodology 
incorporates a multi-strategy in an interactive approach to identify important nuggets. First, 
the methodology employs data mining. Then, the system screens the outcoming models in 
order to identify the important nugget. The system is then used on insurance and fraud 
applications[24]. 
 
He, H. et al. (1999) studied the medical fraud detection problem regarding the General 
Practitioners (GP). The features to classify GP profiles are weighted by genetic algorithms.  
Then, these weights are imposed in K-Nearest Neighbor algorithm in order to detect practice 
profiles. Then, the practice profiles are classified by the Majority Rule and the Bayesian Rule. 
The results are found successful in classifying GP practice profiles in a test dataset. This study 
is said to open the way towards its application in the medical fraud detection at Australia’s 
Health Insurance Commission (HIC) as a routine application [25]. 
 
There are some commercial products and publicly available products in the market 
that claim to be effective medical fraud detection tools. These are: 
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• SPSS : Clementine 10 
• Karypis Lab: CLUTO 
• SAS Institute : Enterprise Miner (EM) 
 
Being a data-mining tool for large-scale databases, Clementine 10 employs “anomaly 
detection” feature that permits it to be used for fraud detection. The incorporated anomaly 
detection scheme can simplify analysis and scoring, improve insight, and facilitate the use of 
these insights in operational deployments. Nonetheless, we haven’t encountered any 
successful application of the software to medical fraud detection problem. 
 
CLUTO being freely available is a family of computationally efficient and high-
quality data clustering and cluster analysis programs and libraries that are well suited for low- 
and high-dimensional data sets and for analyzing the characteristics of the various clusters. 
CLUTO is utilized for clustering data sets arising in many diverse application areas including 
information retrieval, customer purchasing transactions, web, GIS, science, and biology, thus 
can be used for fraud detection.  
 
SAS Enterprise Miner streamlines the data mining process to create accurate 
predictive and descriptive models based on analysis of vast amounts of data from across the 
enterprise. There are organizations using SAS data mining software to detect fraud, anticipate 
resource demands, increase acquisitions and curb customer attrition. The software provides 
multiple advanced predictive and descriptive modeling algorithms, including market basket 
analysis, decision trees, gradient boosting, neural networks, linear and logistic regression, and 
more.   
 
SAS EM and CLUTO have been applied to a large real-life health insurance dataset 
[62]. Experimental results indicate that CLUTO is faster than SAS EM while SAS EM 
provides more useful clusters than CLUTO.  
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2.6. PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
 
In order to conclude that a study is successful, some performance measures should be 
defined and fulfilled. As revealed by Phua, 2004, many studies consider the possible cost 
savings or profits to be the success indicators. Phua et al., 2004; Chan et al., 1999; Fawcett 
and Provost, 1997 define explicit cost. Wang et al., 2003 employ benefit models. For 
telecommunications fraud, Cahill et al., 2002, outlines scoring an instance (a phone call in 
this case) by dividing the similarity measure of it to known fraud examples divided by the 
dissimilarity measure of it to known legal examples. 
 
The unsymmetrical nature of the fraud imposes false positive and false negative error 
costs to unequal. These costs are unstable, changing by time and changing from example to 
example. Since a false negative example can be highly costly and a false positive error only 
costs for the human expert screening time, a false negative error is mostly more costly than a 
false positive error.  
 
Therefore, lately, supervised algorithms based fraud detection methodologies no 
longer use assessments on true positive rate (correctly detected fraud divided by actual fraud) 
and accuracy at a chosen threshold (number of instances predicted correctly, divided by the 
total number of instances). Some employ Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) analysis 
(true positive rate versus false positive rate). Viaene et al. (2004), seek to maximize the Area 
under the Receiver Operating Curve (AUC). Caruana and Niculescu-Mizil (2004) argues that 
the most effective way to assess supervised algorithms is to use one metric from threshold, 
ordering, and probability metrics; and they justify using the average of mean squared error, 
accuracy, and AUC.  
 
Lee and Xiang (2001) define entropy, conditional entropy, relative conditional 
entropy, information gain, and information cost for semi-supervised methodology assessment.  
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Ghosh and Reilly, 1994, illustrate other measurements like the speed of detection 
defined by detection time over time to alarm, the number of types of fraud revealed by the 
system and the format of the detection being online or offline.  
 
When considering insurance fraud detection, some human expert involvement is 
imposed. Von Altrock (1995) asserted their system to perform better than human experts. 
Brockett et al. (2002) and Stefano and Gisella (2001) have found their work to be successful 
even to consistent human expert outcomes. Belhadji et al., 2000 and Williams, 1999, both 
defend the role of human experts in a fraud detection system.   
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Chapter 3 
MATHEMATICAL FORMULATIONS 
 
 
 
Since most of the fraud detection papers focus on nonlinear, black-box supervised 
algorithms as neural networks, we can assert that less complex, reliable and faster algorithms 
are needed for such a research. Given that our database does not have fraudulent and 
legitimate labels for the transactions, our only data mining option for fraud detection is an 
unsupervised approach.   
 
 For auditing medical transactions, it is obvious that we need two tools. One is for 
batch screening/auditing and the other is for online/on time transaction control. This imposes 
building up two systems that are working interactively. Clearly, the online system needs to 
incorporate strategies to overcome the need for re-processing the whole batch of prescriptions 
in every new transaction. Besides these needs, the data structure, and size are the other design 
considerations. We try to fulfill these requirements under the assumption that the fraudulent 
cases are outliers in the database.  
 
 Since many outlier detection algorithms in the literature are designed for the specific 
problem in hand, and since there is no other prescription fraud detection work available in the 
literature, we need to consider our design needs and try to build up an efficient tool for the 
problem.  
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3.1. DATA STRUCTURE 
 
Since data mining tools are developed regarding data structure, as well as the 
dimension and the size of the database in hand, first we need to analyze our database 
structure.  We work on a database of 87,785 prescribed drugs in 2007 and 2008, stored in 
Excel 2007 spreadsheet format. The initial database provided us with 9 features (attributes). 
These 9 features are:  
• Commercial name of the prescribed drug, 
• Barcode number of the drug, 
• Prescription number, 
• Patient number, 
• Age, 
• Sex, 
• ATC code of the drug, 
• ATC name of the drug, 
• Diagnosis for which the drug is prescribed. 
 
Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (ATC) codes were initially recommended by the 
WHO Regional Office for Europe in 1981. In the ATC system, drugs are divided into 
fourteen main groups (1st level), with one pharmacological/therapeutic subgroup (2nd level). 
The 3rd and 4th levels are chemical/pharmacological/therapeutic subgroups and the 5th level 
is the chemical substance. The complete classification of Simvastatin illustrates the structure: 
 
C:  Cardiovascular System 
C10: Serum Lipid Reducing Agents 
C10A: Cholesterol and Triglyceride Reducers 
C10AA: HMG CoA Reductase Inhibitors 
C10AA01: Simvastatin 
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When examining the transactions, we noticed that the ATC code and ATC names 
given in the database are not compatible with the above scheme. Moreover, there were drugs 
that were given different ATC codes when recurred. Thus, we decided to eliminate these 
attributes that could have been very helpful in classifying the drugs. Therefore, we decided to 
add active principle ingredient of the medicament to our database. For this, we have used the 
price lists of 2007 published by the Health Care Ministry, which is an extensive resource on 
commercially available drugs including the active ingredients, pharmacy and depot prices. We 
have matched the ingredients and the prices by an Excel Visual Basic Macro code. 
Nonetheless, the list lacked the information on about 2500 prescribed drugs that were left 
blank for price and ingredient features after executing the Macro code. We have inserted the 
related prices on these manually. Unfortunately, even manually we were not able to identify 
some active ingredients of some drugs that are not currently in the market. Thus, we decided 
not to use active ingredients as a feature in the database. 
 
The next step was to decide on the features to involve in the procedure. It is trivial that  
age and sex are critical features that medical doctors consider in prescribing medicaments. 
Diagnosis is the core feature to judge the fraudulency of a prescription. Price should give us 
an idea of the level of spending per prescription, thus it is also important.  So, the features that 
we are to consider in prescription fraud detection are:  
 
• Commercial name of the prescribed drug, 
• Market price of the prescribed drug, 
• Prescription number, 
• Age, 
• Sex, 
• Diagnosis for which the drug is prescribed, 
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3.2. REVISED METHODOLOGIES 
 
  In the the search for an efficient algorithm for prescription fraud detection, we have 
incorporated some of the existing methodologies for this problem. Among these algorithms 
are: association rules, infrequent item set mining and k-means.  
 
3.2.1. Frequent Item Set Mining/Association Rule Learning 
 
Association rule learning, being a popular method in data mining for revealing 
interesting relations within databases, was the first data mining methodology that we studied 
for the prescription fraud detection. The executable Apriori by Chriatian Borgelt was used as 
the data-mining tool. This tool is also incorporated in the commercial data-mining tool 
Clementine by SPSS. As for the application in our database, we defined the frequency 
threshold very low for the algorithm to give us infrequent item sets. After having run the code 
on the prescription database for the item sets of ATC codes in prescriptions, the results were 
found insignificant by the medical doctor Çağdaş Baran.  
 
3.2.2. Infrequent Item Set Mining 
 
Infrequent item set mining is a new algorithm for minimal infrequent item set mining. 
This algorithm aims to identify the rare item sets seen in a large database [81]. The algorithm 
Minit presented by Haglin and Manning (2007), is designed to serve as a tool for mining those 
rare item sets. We have made use of Minit’s open-source code for mining the infrequent item 
sets in our database.  
 
Consider a feature specification for patients as for sex and age interval. Let the set F 
be the set of the prescriptions that this specified group of patients has been prescribed. 
Assuming that finding a rare item set of drugs in this dataset of prescriptions would mean that 
this rare item set of drugs are from a fraudulent transaction, running Minit on the set F would 
give us those fraudulent transactions in the data set.  
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We have made several trials for incorporating this methodology for the 2007 
prescriptions data that has 57,128 drugs. We have conducted trials on the domains that were 
the meaningful classifications for our database:  
• Women, 
• Men, 
• Infants, 
• Children, 
• Adolescents, 
• Men adults, 
• Women adults, 
• Women adolescents, 
• Men adolescents. 
 
The trials revealed such a big amount of infrequent item sets that we need to consider 
using other scalable methodologies for prescription fraud detection on our large database.  
 
3.2.3. Clustering 
 
Clustering is a methodology for partitioning the observations in hand into k clusters. 
Since the nature of our database do not impose a particular k, we need to define an algorithm 
in which the number of clusters is flexible. Here, we try to cluster the prescriptions, thus the 
observations to work on are prescriptions that are defined to be item sets of medicaments. 
 
For this purpose we have developed a novel algorithm. First let us define similarity 
and quality measures. We define the similarity function as: 212121 ),( ppppppsim ∪∩= , 
where  and  are item sets. On the other hand, our quality measure is 1p 2p ∑
i
ipcsim
2),( , 
where c is the centroid of an item set.  
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Please note that these measures are novel in the sense that they are modifications of 
notations already in use in the literature.  
 
To initialize, we define the first observation to be the centroid. Then we calculate the 
quality regarding this first centroid. In the next iteration, we list all items in the data set and 
rank them according to their occurrence frequencies. We take the first ranking item, put it in 
the centroid and calculate the quality measure. Then we take the second ranking and add this 
item to the centroid and calculate the quality regarding this new centroid, and so on. If an item 
in the list decreases the previously calculated quality, we define the centroid to be the one 
defined in the previous step. After having updated the centroid, we now arrange the clusters. 
We calculate the similarity between the observations and (item sets) and the defined centroid 
for each observation. For the first iteration if the similarity measure between the item set and 
the centroid is bigger than zero, then this item set rests in the initial cluster. If the similarity is 
zero for an item set, this item set defines a new centroid.  
 
After having completed the initialization, we enter the second iteration. In this 
iteration, we recalculate the quality measures for each cluster as we did in the first iteration. 
That way a new centroid is defined for each of the clusters. Then, we recalculate the similarity 
measures between the item sets and centroids. If a similarity measure is below the threshold, 
the item set defines a new cluster; else it remains in the existing cluster. The iterations 
terminate if there is no new cluster to create.  
   
With this algorithm, we aimed to create a non pre-defined number of clusters of the 
dataset. This way we hoped to find fraudulent prescriptions (outliers), which can be defined to 
be small clusters. Unfortunately, this clustering approach based on quality measures, proved 
to be sub-optimal in the tests. That is the reason we consider other approaches here.  
 
3.3. METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN 
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As stated in the previous section, we have a domain of 6 dimensions, meaning that we 
have 6 different features to consider for this database which are; prescription number, 
medicament name, diagnosis, age, sex, and price. If we are to find the fraudulent transactions, 
it is clear that we are involved with a multivariate study.  Nonetheless, if we explicate the 
nature of the data in hand, we see that the correlated features are:  
• Medicament and Diagnosis, 
• Medicament and Age, 
• Medicament and Sex, 
• Diagnosis and the total cost of drugs prescribed for this diagnosis, 
• Medicament and Medicament interactions in a prescription. 
 
Since there is no correlation between the rest like age and sex; we do not need to get 
involved with this cross-feature. Now, let’s consider the interactions between diagnosis and 
age as well as diagnosis and sex. There can be specifications like pediatric diagnoses or 
women illnesses. Then shall we consider these cross-features? The answer is no, since any 
such diagnosis should convey specific medicaments in the prescription. These specific 
medicaments should reveal any mismatching between the diagnosis and age or sex. These 
arguments transform our domain of 6 dimensions to sub-domains of 2 dimensions which are 
illustrated by the above mentioned interactions. Therefore, our problem is refined to deal with 
five two-dimensional spaces. Working with incidence and risk matrices which are to be 
defined in the next sections and having two parts of consideration as online and offline 
processing, our methodology’s flow chart is as: 
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                      Figure 2: Flow chart of the integrated offline and online systems 
34 
 
3.4. RISK FORMULATIONS 
 
To fulfill the design requirements, we introduce the Risk Formulations methodology 
for prescription fraud detection. The methodology consists of identifying the domains to 
apply risk formulations and then gradually constructing incidence matrices on which to 
calculate the risks.  
 
The features that are involved with prescriptions are the prescription number, 
diagnosis, patient id, age of the patient, sex of the patient, practitioner id, the health care 
institution, and the prescribed medicaments. Our data included all but the practitioner and 
health care institution domains. Thus, we have concluded that the fraudulent cases that can be 
identified in our database are:  
 
• Medicament and age mismatch (e.g. prescribing a pediatric medicine to a 
grown up), 
• Medicament and sex mismatch (e.g. prescribing a birth control pill to a male), 
• Medicament and diagnosis mismatch (e.g. in prescribing a antibiotic for a 
simple common cold), 
• Medicament and medicament mismatch (e.g. in prescribing two drugs that are 
contra- indicating), 
• Diagnosis and cost mismatch (e.g. in prescribing medicaments of hundred liras 
of total cost for a simple flu). 
 
After having identified the domains to look for fraud, we build up the appropriate 
methodology under the assumption that fraudulent cases are rare in a large database of 
prescriptions issued by different health care institutions. Thus, what we need to do is detecting 
outliers in a way that the least common observations in one of the above domains are labeled 
to be fraudulent prescriptions. Nonetheless, when we consider the ordered age feature, a 
prescription in which a pediatric drug issued to a 15 year-old should not give a risk equal to 
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the risk of a prescription where the same pediatric drug is issued to a 45 year-old. Therefore, 
we introduce a modified version of risk formulation for ordered features like age.  
 
3.4.1. Risk Formulation for Categorical Features 
 
Sex, diagnosis, and prescription medicaments are non-ordered features, meaning that 
one can neither measure the entities listed in any of those nor make a grandeur comparison 
between those entities.  
 
Consider the data set we work on. First of all, we build up the incidence matrices for 
the categorical features. These matrices hold the information regarding the number of times 
an instance shows up in the data set. In what follows, we describe how incidence matrices are 
created for each domain.  
 
a) Medicament – Sex Domain 
   
Let i represent a certain medicament and j represent the sex that it is issued to. 
Consider the Medicament – Sex incidence matrix denoted by MS. Note that the sex feature 
have two entities: female and male. Thus the size of this matrix is 2*(the number of 
medicaments). Let’s initialize MS(i,j) = 0 for all i and j. We would increment MS(i,j) by one 
every time we encounter a case where the medicament i is issued to the sex j.  
 
           In order to compute the  which is the fraud likelihood of the cases in which  
the  medicament is prescribed for the  sex, we take the maximum of the  row of MS 
denoted by . Thus,  is the number of times medicament i is issued to the 
sex that is most issued to, thus it indicates the sex that the medicament i should be normally 
prescribed to in the cases where there is large gap between the  and MS(i,j). Having 
identified those, the risk formulation is: 
),( jirisk MS
thi thj thi
)(iMaxMS )(iMaxMS
)(iMaxMS
               
36 
 
                           
)1exp(1
))1exp())(),(exp(
),( −−
−−−= iMaxjiMSjirisk MSMS                     (Eq. 3.1) 
 
Then, the risk matrix of the Medicament and Sex domain can be defined as: 
),(),( jiriskjiMSR MS=  
 
Above formulation employs exponential function in order to receive a steep risk 
function since the formulation needs to return high indicators of fraud risk for small values of 
)(),( iMaxjiMS MS , which is the ratio of (i,j) incidence over the . Meaning that the 
function’s sensitivity to detect fraud increases as the ratio 
)(iMaxMS
)(),( iMaxjiMS MS  becomes 
smaller given that the derivative of exp(-x) increases as x gets smaller. Let us illustrate this 
with an example. Consider the medicament A which is an osteoporosis medicament for 
women and B which is an ordinary flu medicament. Let A be prescribed to 2 men and 102 
women. Let B be prescribed to 55 women and 50 men. Then, the calculated risks for A would 
be 0.9693 if prescribed for men and 0 if prescribed for women. The risks for B would be, 
0.0554 if prescribed for men and 0 for women. As illustrated in the Figure 3 below, 
exponential function detects well that the medicament A is a drug for women by giving a high 
risk value for A when given to men; whereas, there is no obvious sex distinction for B. 
 
                  
             Figure 3: Examples of computational effectiveness of the risk formulation 
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If )(),( iMaxjiMS MS=  there is no risk with this transaction, thus, we subtract )1exp(−  
from ))(),(exp( iMaxjiMS MS−  in order for the risk function to be nullified for such legal 
transactions.  Then, we divide the numerator by )1exp(1 −−  in order to attain a scaled value 
for the fraud risk between 0 and 1. Thus, the result is in the range 0-1 where the higher values 
indicate high likelihood of fraud and the lower values indicate low likelihood of fraud. The 
argument is the same for the following formulations.   
 
b) Medicament – Diagnosis Domain 
 
Let i represent a certain medicament and j represent the diagnosis that it is issued with. 
Consider the Medicament – Diagnosis incidence matrix denoted by MD. The size of this 
matrix is the number of medicaments * number of diagnoses. Let’s initialize MD(i,j) = 0 for 
all i and j. We would increment MD(i,j) by one every time we encounter a case where the 
medicament i is issued with the diagnosis j.  
 
In order to compute which is the fraud likelihood of the cases in which the 
medicament is prescribed for the  diagnosis, we take the maximum of the  row of 
MD denoted by . Thus,  is the number of times medicament i is issued 
with the diagnosis that is most issued with, thus carries the information on the diagnosis that 
the medicament i should be normally prescribed to in the cases where there is large gap 
between the and MD(i,j). Then, the risk formulation is as: 
),( jiriskMD
thi thj thi
)(iMaxMD )(iMaxMD
)(iMaxMD
               
             
)1exp(1
)1exp())(),(exp(
),( −−
−−−= iMaxjiMDjirisk MDMD                              (Eq. 3.2) 
The risk matrix of the Medicament and Diagnosis domain is defined as 
. ),(),( jiriskjiMDR MD=
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c)  Medicament – Medicament Domain 
 
Let i represent a certain medicament and j represent another medicament that it is 
issued in the same prescription. Consider the Medicament – Medicament incidence matrix 
denoted by MM. The size of this matrix is (the number of medicaments)*(the number of 
medicaments). Let’s initialize MM(i,j) = 0 for all i and j. Consider the Medicament – 
Medicament incidence matrix denoted by MM. We would increment MM(i,j) by one every 
time we encounter a prescription where the medicament i and j are issued in the same 
prescription.  
 
In order to compute the which is the fraud likelihood of the prescriptions 
in which the  medicament is prescribed with the  medicament, we take the maximum of 
the  row of MG denoted by . Thus,  is the number of times 
medicament i is issued with the medicament that it is most issued with, thus carries the 
information on the medicament that the medicament i should be normally prescribed to in the 
cases where there is large gap between the  and . Having identified those, 
the risk formulation is as: 
),( jiriskMM
thi thj
thi )(iMaxMM )(iMaxMM
)(iMaxMM ),( jiMM
               
             
)1exp(1
)1exp())(),(exp(
),( −−
−−−= iMaxjiMMjirisk MMMM                            (Eq. 3.3)   
 
The risk matrix of the Medicament and Medicament domain is defined as 
. ),(),( jiriskjiMMR MM=
 
3.4.2. Risk Formulation for Ordered Features 
 
In our data set we have Age and Cost as ordered features which need special attention. 
Here, we define the refined formulations for the categorical features.  
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a) Medicament*Age Domain 
 
Let i represent a certain medicament that is prescribed to age j. Consider the 
Medicament – Age incidence matrix denoted by MA. The size of this matrix is (the number of 
medicaments)*(number of ages). Here, the age range is the age range inferred by the dataset. 
Let’s initialize MA(i,j) = 0 for all i and j. We would increment MA(i,j) by one every time we 
encounter a prescription where the medicament i is issued to a patient of age j.  
 
In order to compute the which is the fraud likelihood of the prescriptions 
in which the  medicament is prescribed to a patient at the age j, we take the maximum of 
the  row of MA denoted by . Thus,  is the number of times medicament 
i is issued to the age that is most issued to, thus carries the information on the age that the 
medicament i should be normally prescribed to in the cases where there is large gap between 
the  and MA(i,j). Moreover, we also identify the minimum of the  row of MA 
denoted as  as well as the minimum and maximum age that the prescription i is 
issued to in order to calculate an age range for the medicament. Let  and denote 
the maximum and minimum of ages that the medicament i is prescribed to, respectively. In 
other words, 
),( jiriskMA
thi
thi )(iMaxMA )(iMaxMA
)(iMaxMA
thi
)(iMinMA
jMax jMin
)},()(:{)( jiMAiMaxjiMax MAj ==  and )},()(:{)( jiMAiMinjiMin MAj == . 
Then the age range of medicament i is )()( iMiniMaxr jji −= . Thus, the modified risk 
formulation would be: 
  
)1exp(1
)1exp())))((1())(),((exp(
),( −−
−−−∗−= iiMAMA rjdiMaxjiMAjirisk              (Eq. 3.4) 
 
where,  ∑ ∑∗=
k k
i kiMAkiMAkV )),()),(((   and ii Vjjd −=)( , and the risk matrix 
of the Medicament and Age domain is defined as ),(),( jiriskjiMAR MA= . 
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b) Diagnoses*Cost Domain 
 
Consider a prescription P, in which a number of different diagnoses are seen. Given 
the structure of our database, we can sum up the total cost regarding each of the 
corresponding diagnoses in P. Then we calculate which interval this costs fall into. Note that 
we work with 5 TL intervals for computational efficiency up until 1000 TL. Then for higher 
amounts, we use the indices 201 (for the interval 1000-1500), 202 (for the interval 1500-2000 
TL), 203 (for the interval 2000-2500 TL) and 204 (for the amounts higher than 2500 TL). Let 
the total cost of the diagnosis D be 23 TL in a certain prescription. Then, the interval this 
amount falls into is the 5th interval since 5*4<23<5*5. Having identified the interval for this 
diagnosis D in prescription P, we update the Diagnosis-Cost incidence matrix denoted by DC 
by incrementing DC(d,5) by one. Note that the size of the matrix DC is (the number of 
diagnosis)*(number of cost intervals which is equal to 204).  
 
In order to compute the which is the fraud likelihood of the prescriptions 
in which the  diagnosis is has a total cost in the  interval, we take the maximum of the 
 row of DC denoted by . Thus,  is the number of times diagnosis i is 
issued to the cost interval that is most issued to, thus carries the information on the interval 
that the diagnosis i should be normally prescribed. In here, we also identify the minimum of 
the row of DC denoted . We also identify the minimum and maximum cost 
intervals that the diagnosis i is issued to in order to calculate a price range for the diagnosis. 
Let  and denote the maximum and minimum of intervals that the diagnosis i is 
prescribed to, respectively, where 
),( jiriskDC
thi thj
thi )(iMaxDC )(iMaxDC
thi )(iMinDC
jMax jMin
)},()(:{)( jiDCiMaxjiMax DCj ==  and 
. Then the cost range of the diagnosis i is 
. Thus, the modified risk formulation would be as: 
)},()(:{)( jiDCiMinjiMin DCj ==
)()( iMiniMaxr jji −=
 
)1exp(1
)1exp())))((1())(),((exp(
),( −−
−−−∗−= iiDCDC rjdiMaxjiDCjirisk       (Eq. 3.5) 
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 Where,  ∑ ∑∗=
k k
i kiDCkiDCkV )),()),(((   and ii Vjjd −=)( , and the risk matrix 
of the Diagnosis and Cost domain is defined as ),(),( jiriskjiMDC DC= . 
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Chapter 4 
 
APPLICATION AND 
COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
 
 
We have coded the above mentioned framework and formulations in Matlab 2008A 
release. Our data in hand is composed of 87,785 prescribed drugs in 2007 and 2008. The data 
is in Excel 2007 spreadsheet format having as columns:  
 
• Commercial Drug Name, 
• Prescription Number, 
• Patient’s Age, 
• Patient’s Sex, 
• Diagnosis, 
• Market price of the drug. 
 
Commercial drug name, patient’s sex, and diagnosis columns are in text style. 
Prescription number, patient’s age, and market price of the drug columns are in numeric style.  
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4.1. OFFLINE PROCESSING  
 
We have created an m-file which is the programming medium for Matlab, for the 
offline batch processing of the database. This code on 800 lines, takes the Excel file database 
and processes it to create: 
 
• Drug Name List and Indices, 
• Drug Price List, 
• Diagnoses List and Indices, 
• Age List and Indices.  
 
The lists are created in the appearance order. For example ‘FLIXONASE AQUEOUS 
NASAL SPREY 120 DOSE’ being the first medicament in our database, it is the first in the 
drug name list, so its index is 1. ‘SEDERGINE VIT-C EFERVESANT TABLET 20 TB’ is the 
17th cell in the excel file, but because of the recurrent drugs on the file, this medicament’s 
Drug list Index is 12. The same approach for listing and indexing is valid for the rest of the 
lists.  
 
The next step in processing is building up the incidence matrices for all the domains: 
• Medicament and age: MA, 
• Medicament and sex: MS,  
• Medicament and diagnosis: MD,  
• Medicament and medicament: MM,  
• Diagnosis and cost: DC.  
 
In building up these incidence matrices we make use of the above-mentioned listings. 
Consider the Medicament and Sex incidence matrix MS. This matrix’s column labels are 
sexes: Woman and Man whereas the row labels are the drugs as listed in the Drug Name List. 
Consider the MS(12,1). This is the count of the number of times ‘SEDERGINE VIT-C 
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EFERVESANT TABLET 20 TB’ is prescribed to a woman. The code goes through all the 
drugs and every time a new transaction of ‘SEDERGINE VIT-C EFERVESANT TABLET 20 
TB’ appears, the code updates MS by incrementing MS(12,1) by one if the drug is given to a 
woman and updates MS(12,2) is the drug is prescribed to a man. The same arguments hold for 
the incidence matrices MD, MA, and MM. For the DC matrix, the row labels are diagnoses 
and column labels are indices from 1 to 204. These indices represent 5 TL intervals, but the 
last interval is for the diagnosis costs that are above 2500 TL. Thus, the code goes through all 
the prescriptions and every time a new prescription is encountered, it looks for the diagnoses 
that this prescription includes. Then for every diagnosis within, the total costs of the 
corresponding medicaments are calculated. Let this calculated amount to be 73 TL for 
diagnosis 6. Then the assigned column index for this amount is 15, since 5*14< 73 < 5*15. 
Last, the code increments DC(6,15) by one. 
 
 Now having all the incidence matrices in hand, the code creates risk matrices. These 
matrices are:   
• Medicament and age risks: MAR, 
• Medicament and sex risks: MSR,  
• Medicament and diagnosis risks: MDR,  
• Medicament and medicament risks: MMR,  
• Diagnosis and cost couple’s risks: DCR. 
 
These matrices are all initialized to be zero. Then, they are built up by calculating the 
risks for the corresponding incidences in the corresponding incidence matrices. For example, 
for calculating the ‘SEDERGINE VIT-C EFERVESANT TABLET 20 TB’ drug’s sex risk when 
given to men, we calculate MSR(12,2) by using the corresponding categorical risk 
formulation for MS(12,2). We need to keep the incidence matrices for offline processing, so 
we do not directly update the incidence matrices for risk computations. Note that, for MAR 
and DCR, we need to employ the corresponding ordered feature risk formulations.  
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Having all the risk matrices in hand, the code goes through all the risks that are greater 
than the thresholds given by the user. The user can indicate any threshold he wants for any of 
the risk matrices keeping in mind that more prescriptions would be classified as risky when 
the threshold is kept small. That is, there is a tradeoff between the true positive rate and the 
human expert screening time. The user should define the level of tradeoff he is ready to 
accept. 
  
Given the thresholds, the code outputs the fraudulent prescriptions by indicating which 
types of fraud are seen within the prescriptions. That way, the human expert has the chance to 
revise the outputted prescriptions, which saves time and money to audit large databases.   
 
4.2. ONLINE PROCESSING  
 
The online prescription fraud detection tool is an interactive tool coded in Matlab that 
has a graphical user interface. This interface is designed to enable the user to insert new 
prescriptions to the database and audit a new prescription without the need to re-run the 
offline code. The methodology that lies behind the online code makes use of the global 
variables of the incidence and risk matrices. Thus, new prescription auditing can be done once 
after the offline code is run on the prescription database in hand.  
 
Below you can find the screenshot of the graphical user interface of the auditing tool: 
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               Figure 4: Prescription Auditing Tool User Interface 
 
As seen in the above picture, the user first needs to input the prescription number as 
well as the age and sex of the patient. Then, in the box below the user puts in the prescribed 
drug and the corresponding diagnosis by the add button. The drug and diagnosis list boxes are 
populated by the drug name and diagnosis lists, which are the outputs of the offline fraud 
detection code.  Next step in online fraud detection is checking to see if the input is correct by 
the show prescription button. If the prescription input is correctly specified, the user might 
choose to add the prescription directly to the database. That is achieved by fetching the 
corresponding rows of the incidence and risk matrices and updating those by the online code’s 
input of the incoming prescription specifications. Alternatively, the user might want to audit 
the prescription directly. That way, input of the prescription is not used to update the 
incidence and risk matrices permanently. This is preferable since if the incoming prescription 
is fraudulent, updating the incidence and risk matrices by this input would slightly affect the 
performance of the code, since increasing the number of outliers in a database would 
eventually lead the outliers to be the most common transactions. This would hinder the tool to 
detect those fraudulent transactions. So, the user should add the incoming prescription to the 
database if the prescription is surely not fraudulent, perhaps after the auditing process. 
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Pushing the audit button, the user instantly receives a message indicating each levels of fraud 
riskiness regarding the prescription. Lastly, the new prescription button enables the user to put 
in a new prescription just after auditing another one.  
 
We can assert that this kind of an online tool is necessary given the nature of the 
transactions in the health care sector. 
 
4.3. OFFLINE FRAUD DETECTION RESULTS 
 
We have run the offline code on the database of 87,785 prescribed drugs. As stated 
previously, each run requires the user to specify riskiness thresholds of each kind of 
confirmation check procedure. The code reveals the prescriptions which possesses higher 
risks than the thresholds. We have taken several runs in order to refine the preferable 
threshold for each of the domains.  
 
These runs reveal that the sensitivity levels of each of the criteria are different. The 
reason for that lies in the fact that the sizes of the incidence matrices are different from each 
other and thus the sparseness and intensity characteristics of each differ. That is to say, the 
maximum numbers in a risk matrix’s row and the rows themselves change from matrix to 
matrix for each medicament leading to different sets of risk indicators for the corresponding 
features. Thus, each threshold needs a separate refinement. We have conducted this 
refinement in the supervision of a medical doctor who assessed the significance levels of the 
outputs. The refined model for each auditing task uses the following threshold values: 
 
• Medicament-Diagnosis Domain: 0.85, 
• Medicament-Age Domain: 0.90, 
• Medicament-Sex Domain: 0.96, 
• Medicament-Medicament Domain: 0.95, 
• Diagnosis-Cost Domain: 0.85. 
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For a sample output of the above model, please refer to APPENDIX A. When 
considering the output, we see that the database has:  
• 87,785 lines, 
• 26,419 prescriptions, 
• 2,659 drugs, 
• 332 diagnoses, 
• 963 active ingredients, 
• Patients of minimum age of  0 and maximum age of 85. 
 
An interesting observation about the audit results is that the fraudulent labeled 
prescriptions tend to have multiple numbers of riskiness reasons. For example let’s consider 
the prescription 1592467 of which the database features are given below: 
 
Table 2: Prescription Example-1 
P. No Medicament Name Age Sex Diagnosis Active Ing. 
Price 
(TL) 
1592467 Iliadin  57 M Glaukoma Oksimetazoline 4.59
1592467 Cosopt  57 M Glaukoma 
Tymolol Maleate + 
Dorzolamide 30.80
1592467 Cosopt  57 M Glaukoma 
Tymolol Maleate + 
Dorzolamide 30.80
1592467 Coraspin  57 M Glaukoma   Acetylsalicylic acid 2.40
 
The code’s output for this prescription is as:  
 
Prescription Number: 1592467 
• Incompatibility between Medicament: Iliadin Diagnosis: Glaukoma, Risk: 0.96 
• Incompatibility between Medicament: Coraspin Diagnosis: Glaukoma, Risk: 
0.92 
• Incompatibility between Diagnosis: Glaukoma Cost(TL): 70, Risk: 0.87 
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Cosopt, being an ophthalmic suspension, is a legitimate item in the prescription. 
Nonetheless, Iliadin is a nasal spray and Coraspin is a kind of aspirin. This might be an 
indicator that the fraudsters tend to add several fraudulent items in a prescription that could 
have been legitimate without those.  
 
 Let us now consider Medicament and Medicament non-conforming prescriptions. In 
the first look, it might be surprising to see that there is no prescription with these criteria when 
the threshold is above 0.90. Nonetheless, if we reconsider the nature of the 
Medicament*Medicament incidence matrix, we see that this matrix is of size 2,659*2,659. 
Consider the row i  in this matrix, this row consists of the co-occurrence numbers of the  
medicament with any other medicament. Since there are 2658 other medicaments, it is 
obvious that this medicament i can be seen with a huge number of other drugs in a 
prescription, given the diagnoses comply. That means, theoretically, the rows of MM do not 
constitute skewed distributions. Thus, the maximum of each row, which plays an important 
role in determining the risks regarding any others, is not significant when compared with 
other elements of the row. This theoretic assumption is validated empirically when the code is 
employed. There is no significant risk regarding this criterion. We see such risks only if the 
diagnosis is non-conforming with the medicament also. Please refer to the prescription below 
for further illustration.  
thi
 
P.No Medicament Name Age Sex Diagnosis Active Ing. 
Price 
(TL) 
431603 Euthyrox  49 F Osteoporosis Levotiroxin  2.63 
431603 Fosamax  49 F Osteoporosis Alendronate  39.46
431603 Zyrtec  49 F Osteoporosis  Setirizine hcl 10.77
Table 3: Prescription Example-2 
 
The output of the offline code for this prescription is as: 
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Prescription No: 431603 
Non conformation between Medicament: Zyrtec and Diagnosis: Osteoporosis Risk: 0.93 
Non conformation between Medicament Fosamax and Medicament: Zyrtec, Risk: 0.61 
 
Zyrtec, being an allergy medicament, does not conform to the diagnosis osteoporosis. 
Having so rarely been given with this diagnosis, it has a high risk (0.93) and thus, its 
Medicament vs. Medicament riskiness is high with the osteoporosis medicaments.  
 
In order to enable to check the riskiness of two medicaments, we have coded the 
Active Ingredient and Active Ingredient conformation check for two medicaments in a 
prescription. This might overcome the above stated problems with the MM matrix by working 
on the active ingredients matrix of dimensions 963*963. This scaling down could have 
worked well for such a problem, nonetheless, we were not able to identify the active 
ingredients for a portion of the medicaments, and so we were not able to get the results for our 
database for this kind of detection. 
 
4.4. ONLINE FRAUD DETECTION RESULTS 
 
The most important part of our study is building the online/on time prescription fraud 
detection tool given the nature of the health care transactions. This tool aims to constitute an 
example for the application possibilities regarding our proposed fraud detection methodology. 
As stated above, we have coded the graphical user interface of the tool in Matlab. The tool 
takes the input prescription and the user might choose to: 
 
• View the prescription, 
• Add the prescription to the database, 
• Audit the prescription,  
• Insert a new prescription. 
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For illustrating the effectiveness of the online fraud detection tool, let us consider a 
prescription given to a 55 years old woman. She is diagnosed with the upper respiration tube 
infection and is given the medicaments Sudafed Syrup, Otrivine Pediatric Spray and Stafine 
Pomade. The initial user interface is as seen in Figure 4 after inputting the prescription:  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Inserting a Prescription to the Prescription Auditing Tool 
If the user chooses to view the prescription a message box appears as: 
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                                    Figure 6: Validation Message Box 
 
 After validating the prescription input, the user might choose to add the prescription 
to the database. If so, the below message box appears:  
 
                              
                               Figure 7: Database Update Notification 
 
If the user chooses to audit the prescription the below message box appears:  
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                             Figure 8: Riskiness Levels Screen  
 
Here, risks regarding Medicament and Age non-conformation are stated in the input 
order of the medicaments, just as the Medicament and Sex non-conformation. Considering the 
diagnoses, the Medicament and Diagnosis risks are seen in the screen in the appearance order 
in the prescription of the medicament and diagnosis couples. Diagnosis and Cost non-
conformation risks are seen for each of the diagnosis in the prescription. Here, we see one 
entry for the Diagnosis and Cost non-conformation risk since there is only one diagnosis in 
the prescription.  
 
When we consider the prescription, the diagnosis is upper respiration tube infection. 
Since Sudafed Syrup and Otrivine Pediatric Spray are compatible for this diagnosis, we can 
conclude that, the tool is effective to calculate 0 risks for the medicament and diagnosis 
domain for these two medicaments. For Stafine Pomade, which is a skin care medicament, we 
see that the tool calculates a high risk (0.85), which is expected.  
 
The patient is a 55-year-old woman. Even though there is no risk associated with the 
sex of the patient and the medicaments, Both Sudafed Syrup and Otrivine Pediatric Spray are 
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for children. So, the tool identifies the high risks regarding the age of the patient as to be 0.97 
for Sudafed Syrup and 0.99 for the Otrivine Pediatric Spray.  
 
4.5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
We consider false positive, false negative, and true positive rates as well as the 
agreement rate as performance indicators for our system. We have gone through 1033 
medicaments in 249 prescriptions with M.D. Çağdaş Baran who is a cardio-vascular surgeon 
in Ankara University Cardio Center. Mr. Baran had labeled the fraudulent prescriptions in this 
random sample of 249 prescriptions taken from our database.  We evaluate the results 
obtained from the offline prescription fraud detection tool with the thresholds: 
 
• 0.80  for Medicament and Diagnosis, 
• 0.90  for Medicament and Sex, 
• 0.96 for Medicament and Age, 
• 0.80 for Medicament and Medicament, 
• 0.85 for Diagnosis and Cost. 
 
In this performance measurement study, false positives are the prescriptions that the 
system reveals to be fraudulent even though they are not considered so by human experts. 
False negatives are the prescriptions that the system does not reveal to be fraudulent when 
those are in fact considered so by human experts to be fraudulent transactions. The true 
positive rate is the proportion of correctly detected fraudulent prescriptions to the number of 
actual fraudulent cases. Agreement rate is simply the ratio of the system output which is 
compatible with the human expert auditing over the total number of instances.   
 
We have identified 17 false positives, 19 false negatives, 72 true positives, and 141 
true negatives in this test sample of prescriptions.  
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The comparison between the human expert labeling and our system has led to the 
following results: 
 
• False Positive Rate   = Number of False Positives/Total Number of Instances 
                                       = 6.09% 
• False Negative Rate = Number of False Negatives/Total Number of Instances 
                                 = 7.63% 
• True Positive Rate   = Number of True Positives/ Number of Real Positives 
                                = 77.4% 
• Agreement Rate    = (Number of True Positives + Number of True Negatives)                   
/ Total Number of Instances              
                                            = 85.54%   
 
We have also conducted a benchmarking study to compare our results for the 6% false 
positive rate. Even though we have selected health care fraud detection tools’ performance 
measures for this comparative study, note that we cannot impose a direct comparison between 
the systems since none of the data or algorithms are available for applying to our algorithm or 
database, respectively. Thus, this comparison is conducted in order to give an illustrative 
performance benchmarking.  The studies that we have compared our results are: 
 
• Ortega et al. (2007): A Medical Claim Fraud/Abuse Detection System based on 
Data Mining: A Case Study in Chile 
• Major, J., et al. (2002): EFD: A Hybrid Knowledge/Statistical-Based System 
for the Detection of Fraud 
• He, H., et al. (1999): Application of Genetic Algorithms and k-Nearest 
Neighbor Method in Medical Fraud Detection  
• Yang, W., Hwang S., (2006): A Process-mining Framework for the Detection 
of Health Care Fraud and Abuse  
  
56 
 
 Among those, EFD performs worse with a true positive rate of 26.4% when the false 
positive rate is 5.9% [23]. This gives a true positive over false positive ratio of 4.47. On the 
other hand, this ratio is 12.7 for our system.  
 
The Medical Claim Fraud/Abuse Detection System proposed by Ortega et al. (2007), 
gives 71% true positive rate for the 6% false positive rate level. This indicates a true positive 
over false positive ratio of 11.8 [58]. Eventhough higher than EFD, this rate still can’t catch 
up with our systems performance level of 12.7.  
 
When we consider the next study; by He et al. (1999); we see that authors have 
cooperated a performance measure as the agreement rate. Their system reveals different 
agreement rates for different trials in between 73% to 79% [24]. The best agreement rate 
attained is 78.8%. When compared to our agreement rate of 85.5%, this agreement rate is 
considerably low.  
 
The Process-mining Framework by Yang and Hwang (2006) gives a true positive rate 
of 69% [59]. When compared to 77.4%, we see that our proposed methodology out performs 
this proposed framework as well.  
 
Having considerably better performance on health care fraud detection than all the 
above earlier works in the literature, we can state that our system has revealed satisfactory 
results for this specific domain of fraud detection. 
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Chapter 5 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND 
FURTHER RESEARCH DIRECTION 
 
 
In this thesis, we studied the prescription fraud detection problem. Our novel 
methodology proposes dividing down the 6 dimensional features’ domain into several sub-
domains considering the interaction levels between the features. The studied domains are: 
 
• Medicament and Diagnosis, 
• Medicament and Age, 
• Medicament and Sex, 
• Medicament and Medicament, and 
• Diagnosis and Cost. 
 
The methodology consists of populating incidence matrices for each of the above 
domains and then incorporating a novel data-mining approach for each of the categorical and 
ordered domain. This approach is modeled to fulfill the requirements imposed by the highly 
specialized characteristics of the prescription data. The risk formulations employing this data-
mining approach return riskiness measures for each of the prescriptions and for each of the 
above-mentioned domains. This riskiness measure is scaled to be between 0 and 1, in order to 
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give a straightforward definition of the riskiness level. For each of the domains, the user can 
specify thresholds. That way, the code returns only those prescriptions with higher riskiness 
levels than the thresholds.  
 
We have built up a Matlab code for batch auditing the database in hand. The 
automated fraud detection methodology gives considerably compatible results with the human 
expert auditing.  
 
 We have built up a user-friendly graphical user interface for enabling on time fraud 
detection for the new prescriptions. We can state that online fraud detection tools such as this 
one are needed given the nature of the health care transactions.  
 
 The superiority of our proposed system to the other possible outlier detection 
methodologies for prescription fraud detection is that, it is user friendly since it has been 
flexible enough for an integrated online/on time user interface; it is well tailored for 
prescription fraud detection, it presents a novel and easy way to keep track of health care 
transactions in incidence matrices for auditing, other new detection systems can be built on 
these incidence matrices if needed. Last but not the least, its core methodology is adoptable to 
many other areas in health care and possibly in other industries. 
 
 Given the performance measurements with a true positive rate of 77.4% and a false 
positive rate of 6%, we can conclude that our system works considerably well for the 
prescription fraud detection problem. Nonetheless, future research directions can be stated for 
a superior fraud detection tool.  
 
These future research directions can include refining the offline model in order for it to 
scale well across all domains, meaning that incorporating different parameters for different 
domains so that the same risk measurements mean the same level of riskiness across all 
domains. Also, a tool can be built up where the user can specify the domains he wants work 
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on. Refining the model to be more modular for this purpose can simplify creating similar 
models for other health care areas like: blood tests, x-rays and tomographies. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
SAMPLE MODEL OUTPUT 
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Input File: prescriptions.xlsx contains: 
87785 lines, 
26419 prescriptions, 
2659 drugs, 
332 diagnoses. 
963 active ingredients, 
minimum age= 0, maximum age=85 
 
FrTh_MedicamentDiagnosis = 0.80; %Fraud Threshold for Medicament and Diagnosis risks 
FrTh_MedicamentSex = 0.90; % FraudThreshold for Medicament and Sex risks 
FrTh_MedicamentAge = 0.96; % Fraud Threshold for Medicament and Age risks 
FrTh_MedicamentMedicament = 0.80; % Fraud Threshold for Medicament and Medicament 
risks  
FrTh_DiagnosisCost = 0.85; % Fraud Threshold for Diagnosis and Cost risks 
 
PRESCRIPTION AUDITING: 
Prescription No: 88261 
Prescription No: 124608 
Prescription No: 127947 
Prescription No: 143484 
Prescription No: 143485 
  Medicament: TILCOTIL 20 MG 10  Diagnosis: ULCER non-compatible, Risk: 0.93 
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  Medicament: TONIMER NORMAL SPREY %100 125 ML Diagnosis: ULCER non-
compatible, Risk: 0.87 
  Diagnosis: ULCER Cost: 115 non-compatible, Risk: 0.86 
Prescription No: 159113 
  Medicament: FLIXONASE AQUEOUS NASAL SPREY 120 DOZ Diagnosis: 
BACTERIAL OTITIS MEDIA non-compatible, Risk: 0.94 
  Medicament: KONGEST PILL 30   Diagnosis: BACTERIAL OTITIS MEDIA non-
compatible, Risk: 0.87 
  Medicament: SEDERGINE VIT-C EFERVESANT PILL 20  Diagnosis: BACTERIAL 
OTITIS MEDIA non-compatible, Risk: 0.95 
  Medicament: KONGEST PILL 30   Diagnosis: BACTERIAL OTITIS MEDIA non-
compatible, Risk: 0.87 
  Medicament: KONGEST PILL 30   Diagnosis: BACTERIAL OTITIS MEDIA non-
compatible, Risk: 0.87 
  Medicament: SEDERGINE VIT-C EFERVESANT PILL 20  Diagnosis: BACTERIAL 
OTITIS MEDIA non-compatible, Risk: 0.95 
Prescription No: 159116 
  Medicament: KONGEST PILL 30   Diagnosis: ALLERGIC RINIT non-compatible, Risk: 
0.81 
  Medicament: AUGMENTIN-BID FILM PILL 1000 MG 10  Diagnosis: ALLERGIC RINIT 
non-compatible, Risk: 0.88 
71 
 
  Medicament: KONGEST PILL 30   Diagnosis: ALLERGIC RINIT non-compatible, Risk: 
0.81 
  Medicament: KONGEST PILL 30   Diagnosis: ALLERGIC RINIT non-compatible, Risk: 
0.81 
Prescription No: 159221 
Prescription No: 159358 
  Medicament: CEFATIN 500 LAKPILL 500 MG 10  Diagnosis: COMPLEXION DISEASE  
non-compatible, Risk: 0.81 
  Diagnosis: COMPLEXION DISEASE  Cost: 130 non-compatible, Risk: 0.99 
Prescription No: 159368 
Prescription No: 159387 
  Medicament: CALCIUM SANDOZ+VITAMIN C EFERVESANT PILL 10  (NOVARTIS) 
Diagnosis: BRONCHIECTASIS  non-compatible, Risk: 0.86 
  Medicament: CATAFLAM PILL 50 MG 20 DR Diagnosis: BRONCHIECTASIS  non-
compatible, Risk: 0.91 
Prescription No: 159510 
Prescription No: 159544 
Prescription No: 159553 
Prescription No: 159696 
Prescription No: 159706 
  Medicament: PHARMATON CAPSULE 30 CAP Diagnosis: 
HYPERCHOLESTEROLEMIA  non-compatible, Risk: 0.87 
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  Medicament: PHARMATON CAPSULE 30 CAP Diagnosis: HYPERTYROID non-
compatible, Risk: 0.98 
Prescription No: 159708 
  Medicament: METPAMID PILL 10 MG 30  Diagnosis: BACTERIAL COLON DISEASES  
non-compatible, Risk: 0.90 
  Medicament: REFLOR CAPSULE 250 MG 10 CAP. Diagnosis: BACTERIAL COLON 
DISEASES  non-compatible, Risk: 0.86 
Prescription No: 159711 
  Medicament: TEARS NATURALE FREE 0,8 ML 32 TUBE Diagnosis: DIABETES 
MELLITUS , Risk: 0.96 
  Medicament: CALCIUM SANDOZ FORTE EFERVESANT PILL 10  Diagnosis: 
DIABETES MELLITUS , Risk: 0.88 
  Medicament: CALCIUM SANDOZ FORTE EFERVESANT PILL 10  Diagnosis: 
DIABETES MELLITUS , Risk: 0.88 
  Medicament: TEARS NATURALE FREE 0,8 ML 32 TUBE Diagnosis: OSTEOPOROSIS  
non-compatible, Risk: 0.92 
Prescription No: 159938 
Prescription No: 159959 
  Medicament: DOLVEN PEDIATRIC 100 ML SYRUP Diagnosis: KAS-ISKELET 
SISTEMI HASTALIKLARI non-compatible, Risk: 0.99 
Prescription No: 160000 
Prescription No: 160054 
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Prescription No: 160080 
Prescription No: 160217 
Prescription No: 160441 
Prescription No: 160459 
Prescription No: 160503 
Prescription No: 160507 
  Medicament: ANDOREX 30 ML SPREY Diagnosis: BRONCHIECTASIS  non-compatible, 
Risk: 0.83 
 non-compatible, Risk: 0.90 
  Medicament: UMCA 50 ML SOLUTION Diagnosis: BRONCHIECTASIS  non-compatible, 
Risk: 0.83 
Prescription No: 160512 
  Medicament: ANDOREX 30 ML SPREY Diagnosis: BRONCHIECTASIS  non-compatible, 
Risk: 0.90 
  Medicament: OTRIVINE PEDIATRIC NASAL SPREY %0.05 10 ML Diagnosis: 
BRONCHIECTASIS non-compatible, Risk: 0.89 
  Medicament: OTRIVINE PEDIATRIC NASAL SPREY %0.05 10 ML Age: 15 non-
compatible, Risk: 0.99 
Prescription No: 160521 
Prescription No: 160551 
Prescription No: 160787 
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  Medicament: SERETIDE DISKUS 500 MCG 60 DOSE Diagnosis: BACTERIAL UPPER 
RESPIRATION TUBE INFECTION non-compatible, Risk: 0.89 
  Medicament: SERETIDE DISKUS 500 MCG 60 DOSE Diagnosis: BACTERIAL UPPER 
RESPIRATION TUBE INFECTION non-compatible, Risk: 0.89 
  Diagnosis: BACTERIAL UPPER RESPIRATION TUBE INFECTION Cost: 320 non-
compatible, Risk: 1.00 
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